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1. Semantic externalism (henceforth: externalism) is the thesis that the contents of 
intentional states (such as beliefs) and speech acts (such as assertions) are not 
determined by the way the subjects of those states or acts are internally.1 Externalism 
is a widely accepted but not entirely uncontroversial thesis. Among widely accepted 
but not entirely uncontroversial theses in philosophy, externalism is notable for owing 
the assent it commands almost entirely to thought experiments—especially to 
Putnam’s (1975) ‘Twin Earth’ thought experiment. The latter is arguably—along with 
Gettier’s (1963) refutation of the justified true belief (JTB) analysis of knowledge—
one of the two most influential thought experiments in the history of analytic 
philosophy.  
For this reason, like the view that knowledge is not JTB, one might treat 
externalism as a test case: is thought experimentation required for establishing the 
view, or are there some widely accepted general principles from which the view can 
be derived purely by deduction? Recently, Williamson (2013, 2015) has argued that 
the latter is the case for the view that knowledge is not JTB: the existence of 
counterexamples to the JTB analysis of knowledge can be shown using certain natural 
models for epistemic logic. This paper argues for a similar conclusion about 
externalism: it is a deductive consequence of a pair of widely accepted general 
principles whose relevance to the issue has so far gone unnoticed. 
 To avoid any misunderstandings, I should say something about my motives for 
engaging in this intellectual exercise. A good deal of recent metaphilosophy exhibits 
hostility towards thought experimentation, as well as towards certain less clearly 
demarcated practices in the vicinity, variously described as ‘appealing to intuitions’, 
‘using intuitions as evidence’, making ‘judgments about cases’, and the like. This 
paper has no such agenda. I believe that thought experiments can be used to acquire 
knowledge of important philosophical truths, and that various important philosophical 
                                                
1 This is, of course, not the only thesis that the label ‘semantic externalism’ has been used for. For 
example, Putnam, who does not use the term in his (1975), is often called a ‘semantic externalist’, but 
he argues that the ‘meaning’ of an utterance of a linguistic expression is not determined by the way the 
utterer is internally, and it is unclear whether by ‘meaning’ he means content—which can be specified 
by ‘that’-clauses—or something like ‘character’ in Kaplan’s (1989) sense—which cannot. 
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truths have, in fact, been discovered by thought experimentation,2 with externalism 
itself being a case in point. 
 However, when thought experiments are dispensable, and they can be replaced 
by a straightforward deductive argument from premises widely accepted on both sides 
of a debate, this is well worth knowing because the deductive argument can be more 
dialectically effective. If one can deduce a claim one’s opponents reject from claims 
they accept, and the validity of the deduction is not in dispute, one is done. The 
opponents are forced to change their minds about something. If the premises are well 
chosen—in particular, if they are widely treated as fairly obvious by both sides—it 
will be especially difficult for the opponents to maintain their opposition. In contrast, 
a thought experiment scenario is inevitably underspecified in various ways while 
being overspecified in others—a combination that gives rise to the familiar problem 
of ‘deviant realizations’3 and tempts the opponents of the thesis supported by the 
thought experiment to respond by studying (sometimes irrelevant) details of the 
scenario, and the defenders of the thesis to respond by proposing variants of the 
original scenario. Diminishing returns can be expected when this process is iterated. 
 A related point: I take it that everyone agrees that excessive reliance on 
thought experiments in a particular philosophical literature can have deleterious 
effects. One risk is that philosophers will, while focusing on the details of thought 
experiment scenarios, fail to notice certain structural principles that, if explicitly 
articulated, could significantly move the dialectic forward. Whether, and to what 
extent, the vast literature inspired by Putnam (1975) is at such an impasse is 
debatable. But it is clear that that literature has largely focused on the details of 
Putnam’s thought experiment scenario, on coming up with and considering variants of 
it (‘dry earth’, ‘slow switching’, etc.), and on considering various issues tangentially 
implicated in that scenario, such as the semantics and metasemantics of natural kind 
terms. As this paper will show, there is no need at all to think through any thought 
experiment scenarios, so a fortiori not ones involving natural kind terms, to appreciate 
the appeal of externalism. 
 
2. For simplicity’s sake, I will focus on the case of belief. Everything I will say about 
belief could also be said, mutatis mutandis, about other propositional attitudes and 
about speech acts.4 Externalism will now be understood as the thesis that the content 
of a belief is not determined by the way the subject of the belief is internally. Or, 
more precisely, since a subject may have several beliefs not all of which have the 
same content: the content of a belief is not determined by the way the subject of the 
                                                
2 See Williamson (2007: ch. 6) for a defense of this view. 
3 See Williamson (2007: ch. 6) for discussion. The term ‘deviant realization’ is due to Malmgren 
(2011). The problem is less pressing when thought experiments are reconstructed, following 
Williamson, using counterfactual conditionals, but the antecedents of counterfactuals may also be 
realized in unintended ways. 
4 In some cases the required adjustments will be less obvious than in others. For example, in the case of 
non-truth-evaluable attitudes like desire, we cannot speak of the attitude having a truth value, as I do in 
§3. But we can relate desires to truth in a way that will allow the argument of §3 to go through. 
Necessarily, a desire is satisfied iff its content is true. Thus, if we interpret the variables of §3 as 
ranging over desires, we may interpret v as, say, a function that assigns 1 to a desire if it is satisfied and 
otherwise assigns 0 to it, and assigns 1 to a content if the content is true and otherwise assigns 0 to it.  
 3 
belief is internally together with the way in which the belief is related to the way the 
subject is internally. 
 Beliefs here must be thought of as tokens rather than types. In this sense, no 
two subjects share a belief. While there is a natural sense in which you and I share a 
belief when we both believe that the sky is blue, there is an equally natural sense in 
which we don’t share any beliefs. In this latter sense we may, for example, truly say 
that my belief was formed by a certain method while yours was not. For this to be 
true, our beliefs must be distinct, even though they have the same content: that the sky 
is blue. 
 The content of a belief is what is believed: the content of one’s belief that p is 
that p. I will make no substantive assumptions about the kinds of entities the contents 
of belief are, other than that they can be specified by ‘that’-clauses: ‘that the sky is 
blue’ specifies the content that the sky is blue, ‘that 1 + 1 = 2’ specifies the content 
that 1 + 1 = 2, and so on. 
 Let us now make the thesis of externalism (as applied to beliefs) a bit more 
precise. Above I glossed it as the thesis that the content of a belief is not determined 
by the way the subject of the belief is internally and the way in which the belief is 
related to the way the subject is internally. We can avoid various complications by 
adopting (following much of the literature) the ideology of narrowness, duplication 
and correspondence. Things that are internally the same are said to be duplicates. 
Whenever S and S¢ are duplicates, there is an intuitive sense in which each part of S 
corresponds to a part of S¢. If S and S¢ are normal human subjects, then S’s head 
corresponds to S¢’s head, S’s heart corresponds to S¢’s heart, and so on. In the same 
intuitive sense, each belief of one of a pair of duplicate subjects corresponds to a 
belief of the other. For example, if your belief that snow is white is the only belief you 
formed during the 25,000,000th time you exhaled, and there is a duplicate of you, then 
your duplicate’s corresponding belief is the only belief he or she formed during the 
25,000,000th time he or she exhaled. The relevant notion of correspondence can be 
made precise in various ways,5 but for present purposes the intuitive notion will 
suffice, because nothing in this paper turns on whether some particular actual or 
possible belief of one of a pair of duplicate subjects corresponds to a belief of the 
other. Finally, let us say that a property P of beliefs is narrow iff, necessarily, any 
corresponding beliefs of duplicate subjects either both have P or both lack P; 
otherwise P is broad. Saying that a property of beliefs is narrow in this sense is one 
way of making (relatively) precise the idea that whether a belief has that property is 
determined by the way the subject of the belief is internally together with the way the 
belief relates to the way the subject is internally. 
 Clearly not all properties of beliefs are narrow. Clearly not even all semantic 
properties of beliefs are narrow: truth is a paradigmatic broad semantic property. 
Content is a disputed case. Externalism can now be precisified as the thesis that 
                                                
5 See Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne (forthcoming: ch. 1, sec. 3). 
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content is a broad property of beliefs.6 I will call the negation of externalism 
internalism.7 
 This way of understanding ‘determination’ in the initial, rough statement of 
externalism in §1 is in line with much of the literature, including the ur-text (Putnam 
1975). Here narrowness is, following Putnam, understood as a species of weak 
supervenience on the internal.8 The A-properties weakly supervene on the B-
properties iff it is necessary that any things that have the same B-properties have the 
same A-properties. (In the case at hand, having the same B-properties amounts to 
being corresponding beliefs of duplicate agents.9) ‘Determination’ could also be 
interpreted as strong supervenience, but since a refutation of a weak supervenience 
thesis is also a refutation of the corresponding strong supervenience thesis, it suffices 
to focus on weak supervenience here. 
 
3. The argument will be formalized in a language of first-order modal logic with 
function symbols, identity, and the necessity operator £, which can be interpreted as 
expressing metaphysical necessity or any other species of objective necessity (in the 
sense of Williamson 2017), such as nomological necessity. The formalization of an 
argument as simple as the one that follows may strike some readers as overkill, but it 
is helpful in that it enables us to see just which logical principles the argument relies 
on. It will turn out that the argument will go through in an extremely weak logic, so 
its validity will presumably not be disputed. 
 We interpret the formal language so that the variables range over beliefs, the 
two-place predicate C expresses the relation of being corresponding beliefs of 
duplicate subjects, and the function symbols c and v express, respectively, content and 
truth value. That is to say, c(t) refers to the content of whatever t refers to and v(t) 
refers to its truth value. 
 The formalization of internalism, then, is: 
 
NARROWC: £ "x "y (C(x, y) ® c(x) = c(y)) 
 
                                                
6 This involves some fudging. Content is not a property of beliefs, just as truth value is not (although 
truth is). Content and truth value are both functions from beliefs to other things. Functions from beliefs 
to other things are narrow in a derivative sense, which is the sense I use in the text: see Yli-Vakkuri and 
Hawthorne (forthcoming: ch. 1, sec. 3) for the details. 
7 Who are the internalists? Lewis (1979), Segal (2000), and Farkas (2006, 2008) are perhaps the 
clearest cases. It is also natural to interpret Searle’s (1983: ch. 8, sec. I) claim that ‘Intentional content’ 
is ‘in the head’ as entailing internalism. 
8 Putnam’s famous thought experiment is presented as a counterexample to a combination of two 
supervenience theses, both of which are expressed using ‘determine’, which is not further explained. It 
is nevertheless clear that Putnam is using ‘determine’ to express weak supervenience rather than strong, 
because one of the two theses is that ‘the meaning of a term … determines its extension’ (Putnam 
1975: 136). Obviously extension at most weakly supervenes on meaning. It is not the case, for 
example, that, necessarily, if the number of baboons is different from the actual number of baboons, 
then the meaning of ‘baboon’ is different from the actual meaning of ‘baboon’. There could have been 
one baboon fewer or more than there actually is without any difference in the meaning of ‘baboon’, but 
the strong supervenience of extension on meaning is inconsistent with this fact. 
9 The claim that a certain property is narrow in the present sense is, in fact, equivalent to a weak 
supervenience thesis of the standard form, but the story of what the B-properties are in this case is too 
complicated to be told here. See Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne (forthcoming: ch. 1, sec. 3). 
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NARROWC says that, necessarily, any corresponding beliefs of duplicate subjects have 
the same content, i.e., that content is narrow. 
 The argument against NARROWC has just two premises. The first premise is so 
trifling that it already figured as an example in the stage-setting in §2: it is the 
assumption that truth is not narrow. This is formalized as: 
 
BROADT: ¬ £ "x "y (C(x, y) ® v(x) = v(y)) 
 
BROADT says that it is not necessary that all corresponding beliefs of duplicate 
subjects have the same truth value. Since this assumption passed without comment in 
§2—truth being a paradigmatically broad semantic property—it will pass without 
comment here too. 
 The second premise requires some comment, although it, too, is presumably 
common ground between externalists and their opponents:  
 
TRANSPARENCY: £ "x v(x) = v(c(x)) 
 
TRANSPARENCY says that, necessarily, the truth value of a belief is the same as the 
truth value of its content. I don’t think this principle is particularly in need of an 
argument, but here is one anyway: 
 Suppose for a contradiction that TRANSPARENCY is false. Then it is possible 
that there is a subject S with a belief with a certain content, that p, but S’s belief that p 
and (the content) that p differ in truth value. This can only come about in two ways. 
The first way is this: S’s belief that p is true but it is not true that p (i.e., that p is not 
true). This is equivalent to: S’s belief that p is true, and it is not the case that p, which 
is impossible. The second way: S’s belief that p is not true but it is true that p (i.e., 
that p is true). This is equivalent to: S’s belief that p is not true, and p, which is 
impossible. Both are impossible, so it is not possible for there to a belief that differs in 
truth value from its content. 
It is straightforward to show that the set {TRANSPARENCY, BROADT, 
NARROWC} is inconsistent, while {TRANSPARENCY, BROADT} is consistent, even in an 
extremely weak system of quantified modal logic that results from combining the 
weakest normal modal logic K with standard first-order logic (FOL). {BROADT, 
TRANSPARENCY, NARROWC} is inconsistent, for example, in the extraordinarily weak 
system that we get by taking any standard axiomatization of FOL and adding to it as 
axioms (i) all instances of the K axiom schema £(f ® y) ® (£f ® £y), (ii) all 
truth-functional tautologies, and (iii) adding the ‘necessitation’ rule f/£f, where f is 
a closed theorem of FOL (i.e., an FOL theorem with no free variables).10 Thus there is 
                                                
10 An Associate Editor and an anonymous referee suggested that I include a proof, so I will. I will adopt 
the following abbreviations. 
A  =  "x "y (C(x, y) ® c(x)=c(y)) 
B  =  "x v(x) = v(c(x)) 
C  =  "x "y (C(x, y) ® v(x) = v(y)) 
And I will use ‘⊢’ to express derivability in the system described above. 
First note that (A Ù B) ® C is a closed FOL theorem. By (iii), then: 
(1) ⊢ £((A Ù B) ® C). 
By (i), we also have each of: 
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a derivation of the negation of NARROWC from TRANSPARENCY and BROADT in the 
system. But NARROWC expresses internalism, and the negation of internalism is 
externalism, so there is a derivation of externalism from TRANSPARENCY and BROADT 
in the system. Since TRANSPARENCY and BROADT are true, and derivability in the 
system preserves truth, externalism is true. 
 
4. The argument of §3 is not, of course, psychologically impossible to resist—no 
philosophical argument is. A sufficiently dedicated internalist will find a way to resist 
it. Here I will quickly examine two strategies for doing so and indicate why I find 
them unpromising. (There are, of course, indefinitely many other ways to resist the 
argument, but the two ways I will discuss are the only ones I have encountered in 
discussions with internalists and philosophers willing to play devil’s advocate on 
behalf of internalism.) 
 Each strategy builds on Lewis’s (1979) observation that internalists must be 
relativists, in the sense that they must think that it is possible for a belief’s content to 
have different truth values for different subjects and at different times. But each 
strategy goes much further than Lewis, representing a radical position hitherto 
unexplored in the literature on internalism. 
 The first strategy is to somehow use Lewis-style relativism to motivate 
denying TRANSPARENCY. (I’ll leave it for those who wish to pursue this strategy to 
construct an argument from that form of relativism to the negation of 
TRANSPARENCY.) This strategy takes us into territory that is as yet unexplored by 
internalists, and it is even contrary to the spirit of mainstream relativism. As far as I 
know, no internalist so far has questioned TRANSPARENCY, and a good deal of work 
in relativist semantics is motivated by a desire to keep transparency-of-truth principles 
like TRANSPARENCY.11 In the words of the leading contemporary relativist: 
 
                                                                                                                                       
(2) ⊢ £((A Ù B) ® C) ® (£(A Ù B) ® £C)    
(3) ⊢ £(A ® (B ® (A Ù B))) ® (£A ® £(B ® (AÙB)))  
(4) ⊢ £(B ® (A Ù B))®(£B ® £(A Ù B))   
The rest of the proof only requires truth-functional logic and a single application of (iii). Because 
A®(B®(AÙB)) is a closed FOL theorem, by (iii), 
(5) ⊢ £(A ® (B ® (A Ù B))), 
(3) and (5) imply: 
(6) ⊢	£A ® £(B ® (A Ù B)) 
(4) and (6) imply: 
(7) ⊢ £A ® (£B ® £(A Ù B)) 
(7) implies: 
(8) ⊢ (£A Ù £B) ® £(A Ù B) 
(1) and (2) imply: 
(9) ⊢ £(A Ù B) ® £C 
(8) and (9) imply: 
(10) ⊢ (£A Ù £B) ® £C 
By (10), {£A, £B} ⊢ £C, so {£A, £B, ¬£C} = {TRANSPARENCY, BROADT, NARROWC} is 
inconsistent in the system. 
11 TRANSPARENCY is not a standard form or transparency principle, but, like the more standard 
principles, it underwrites ‘disquotational’ inferences—in this case, inferences from ‘x is a true belief 
whose content is p’ to ‘p’ (via the transparency of truth for contents). 
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[E]ven committed relativists about some area of discourse will want the conveniences 
afforded by a disquotational [i.e., transparent] truth predicate when they are engaging in that 
discourse. Moreover, it is easy to give a semantics for monadic “true” and “false” that works 
in an analytic relativist framework and ratifies the disquotational inferences’. (MacFarlane 
2011: 442) 
 
Since MacFarlane is concerned with the semantics of language rather than thought, 
TRANSPARENCY is not among the transparency principles he discusses, but there is no 
greater difficulty involved in defining a transparent (‘disquotational’) truth predicate 
that applies to beliefs within a relativist semantic framework.12 
 The second strategy is even more radical than the first: it is to attempt to use 
Lewis-style relativism to motivate the view that TRANSPARENCY somehow does not 
make sense or is meaningless. An internalist pursuing this strategy will insist that the 
notion of relative truth for contents—truth relative to a subject and a time—is the only 
intelligible one, and it is simply nonsense to speak of a content being true or false 
simpliciter. This kind of internalist faces an uphill battle in explaining why 
MacFarlane has not, despite appearances, succeeded in deploying a meaningful 
monadic truth predicate. 
 Both strategies look seriously undermotivated, but that is not the main 
problem they have. The main problem is that they either lead to absurdities or deprive 
the internalist of the means to deny absurdities.  
Consider the first strategy. Here is a definition of truth for beliefs: a belief is 
true iff its content is true. Here is a definition of truth for contents: the content that p 
is true iff p. The first strategy is committed to denying at least one of these definitions. 
Since they are definitions, we may necessitate them, and their necessitations entail 
TRANSPARENCY in the same weak logic assumed in §3, supplemented by 
propositional quantification, very elementary arithmetic, and bivalence.13 
Obviously, the first strategy is also committed to the existence of 
counterexamples to TRANSPARENCY. But what would these counterexamples look 
like? They must be cases in which either (i) a subject S believes that p, and p, yet S’s 
belief that p is false, or (ii) S believes that p, and it is not the case that p, yet S’s belief 
                                                
12 I prefer ‘transparent’ to ‘disquotational’ because various transparency-of-truth principles do not 
involve quotation. TRANSPARENCY is a case in point. 
13 The necessitations of the definitions of truth for beliefs and contents are formalized, respectively, as 
(1) and (2). 
(1) £ "x (x is true « $p(c(x) = p Ù p)) 
(2) £ "p (p is true « p) 
(3) is derivable from (1) and (2). 
(3) £ "x (x is true « c(x) is true) 
Now given that ‘x is true’ is defined as v(x) = 1, and that we have necessitated bivalence (£ "x (v(x) = 
1 Ú v(x) = 0)) and £0 ≠ 1 as theorems, we can also derive TRANSPARENCY. Specifically, the system I 
have in mind is constructed exactly like the weak system described in §3, except in that the non-modal 
language we begin with has both first-order and propositional quantification, a propositional identity 
predicate (with the analogues of the first-order axioms for these), as well as "x(v(x) = 1 Ú v(x) = 0)) 
and 0 ≠ 1 as axioms. 
 (A technical aside: the above presentation cuts some corners. Since c must now be of type 
e®t, v(x) and v(c(x)) cannot both be well-formed. In fact, we’ll have to express truth value with two 
function symbols, v, v¢, of different types, and consequently we’ll need two axioms of bivalence, and 
TRANSPARENCY will have the form £"x v(x) = v¢(c(x)).) 
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that p is true. But this is absurd, as can be seen immediately by instantiating the 
variables. It is clearly not possible, say, that Jones believes that Antwerp is in 
Belgium, and Antwerp is in Belgium, yet Jones’ belief that Antwerp is in Belgium is 
false. It is also clearly not possible that Jones believes that Antwerp is in the 
Netherlands, and Antwerp is not in the Netherlands, yet Jones’ belief that Antwerp is 
in the Netherlands is true. The advocate of the first strategy is committed to the absurd 
position that cases like this are possible. 
The advocate of the second strategy may seem to have it easier, since she will 
not be committed to the absurdities discussed above. But she is also not committed to 
the negations of those absurdities, since both the absurdities and their negations are 
inexpressible—are nonsense—according to her position. Claiming that an obvious 
truth is nonsense may be less of an affront to reason than denying one, but both of the 
relativist approaches are deeply uninviting.14 
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